Rail War - Partisans - Heroes - File catalog - zoya. “Rail war” and other methods of struggle of Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War

Rail War." Operation Concert. Guerrilla heroes

The scope of the partisan movement is evidenced by a number of major operations carried out jointly with the Red Army. One of them was called “Rail War”. It was carried out in August-September 1943 on the enemy-occupied territory of the RSFSR, the Belarusian and part of the Ukrainian SSR with the aim of disabling the railway communications of the Nazi troops. This operation was connected with the plans of the Headquarters to complete the defeat of the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge, conduct the Smolensk operation and an offensive to liberate Left Bank Ukraine. The TsShPD also attracted Leningrad, Smolensk, and Oryol partisans to carry out the operation.

The order to conduct Operation Rail War was given on June 14, 1943. Local partisan headquarters and their representatives at the fronts assigned areas and objects of action to each partisan formation. The partisans were supplied with explosives and fuses from the “Mainland”; reconnaissance was actively carried out on the enemy’s railway communications. The operation began on the night of August 3 and continued until mid-September. The fighting behind enemy lines took place on an area extending about 1000 km along the front and 750 km in depth, about 100 thousand partisans took part in them with the active support of the local population.

A powerful blow to the railways in territory occupied by the enemy came as a complete surprise to him. For a long time, the Nazis were unable to counteract the partisans in an organized manner. During the operation “Rail War”, over 215 thousand railway rails were blown up, many trains with Nazi personnel and military equipment were derailed, railway bridges and station buildings were blown up. The capacity of the railways decreased by 35-40%, which thwarted the Nazis' plans to accumulate material resources and concentrate troops, and seriously hampered the regrouping of enemy forces.

The partisan operation codenamed “Concert” was subordinated to the same goals, but already during the upcoming offensive of Soviet troops in the Smolensk, Gomel directions and the battle for the Dnieper. It was carried out from September 19 to November 1, 1943 on the fascist-occupied territory of Belarus Karelia, in the Leningrad and Kalinin regions, in the territory of Latvia, Estonia, Crimea, covering a front of about 900 km and a depth of over 400 km.

It was a planned continuation of the “Rail War” operation; it was closely connected with the upcoming offensive of Soviet troops in the Smolensk and Gomel directions and during the Battle of the Dnieper.
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193 partisan detachments (groups) from Belarus, the Baltic states, Karelia, Crimea, Leningrad and Kalinin regions (over 120 thousand people) were involved in the operation, which were supposed to undermine more than 272 thousand rails.

On the territory of Belarus, more than 90 thousand partisans took part in the operation; they had to blow up 140 thousand rails. The Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement planned to throw 120 tons of explosives and other cargo to the Belarusian partisans, and 20 tons to the Kaliningrad and Leningrad partisans.

Due to the sharp deterioration of weather conditions, by the beginning of the operation, only about half of the planned amount of cargo was transferred to the partisans, and therefore it was decided to begin mass sabotage on September 25. At the same time, some of the detachments that had already reached the initial lines could not take into account the changes in the timing of the operation and began to implement it on September 19. On the night of September 25, simultaneous actions were carried out according to the plan for Operation Concert at a front of about 900 km (excluding Karelia and Crimea) and at a depth of over 400 km.

Local headquarters of the partisan movement and their representation at the fronts assigned areas and objects of action to each partisan formation. The partisans were provided with explosives and fuses, mine demolition classes were held at “forestry courses”, metal was mined from captured shells and bombs at local “factories”, and fastenings for metal blocks to rails were made in workshops and forges. Reconnaissance was actively carried out on the railways. The operation began on the night of August 3 and continued until mid-September. The actions took place on an area with a length of about 1000 km along the front and 750 km in depth, about 100 thousand partisans took part in them, who were helped by the local population. A powerful blow to the railway. lines was unexpected for the enemy, who for some time could not counteract the partisans in an organized manner. During the operation, about 215 thousand rails were blown up, many trains were derailed, railway bridges and station buildings were blown up. The massive disruption of enemy communications significantly complicated the regrouping of retreating enemy troops, complicated their supply, and thereby contributed to the successful offensive of the Red Army.

The objective of Operation Concert was to disable large sections of railway lines in order to disrupt enemy transport. The bulk of the partisan formations began hostilities on the night of September 25, 1943. During Operation Concert, Belarusian partisans alone blew up about 90 thousand rails, derailed 1041 enemy trains, destroyed 72 railway bridges, and defeated 58 garrisons of the invaders. Operation Concert caused serious difficulties in the transportation of Nazi troops. The railway capacity has decreased by more than three times. This made it very difficult for the Nazi command to maneuver their forces and provided enormous assistance to the advancing Red Army troops.

It is impossible to list here all the partisan heroes whose contribution to the victory over the enemy was so noticeable in the common struggle of the Soviet people over the Nazi invaders. During the war, wonderful partisan command cadres grew up - S.A. Kovpak, A.F. Fedorov, A.N. Saburov, V.A. Begma, N.N. Popudrenko and many others. It should be noted that in terms of its scale, political and military results, the nationwide struggle of the Soviet people in the territories occupied by Hitler’s troops acquired the significance of an important military-political factor in the defeat of fascism. The selfless activities of the partisans and underground fighters received national recognition and high praise from the state. More than 300 thousand partisans and underground fighters were awarded orders and medals, incl. over 127 thousand - medal “Partisan of the Great Patriotic War” 1st and 2nd degree, 248 awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Rail War." Operation Concert. Guerrilla heroes - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Rail War". Operation "Concert". Guerrilla Heroes" 2017, 2018.

In general, in the partisan movement in Belarus During the Great Patriotic War, according to official data, 373,492 people took part. Among them were representatives of almost 70 nationalities of the USSR and many European nations: hundreds of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Yugoslavs, dozens of Hungarians, French, Belgians, Austrians, and Dutch.

7.3. Forms of guerrilla warfare. "Rail War" and its goals

The tactics of guerrilla warfare are of great importance in conducting combat operations behind enemy lines. On the one hand, they have much in common with the combat operations of regular troops, on the other hand, they have specific features - the partisan front exists without flanks and rear.

The actions of the partisans included mainly three types of activities: combat, sabotage and reconnaissance, and were carried out in four main forms: operations of individual detachments in one administrative region; actions of a group of detachments and formations in the territory turned into partisan zones and regions; guerrilla operations in cooperation with units of the regular army and raids of partisan formations across enemy-occupied territory.

The most effective method of guerrilla warfare was sabotage, especially widely carried out on enemy communications. And if at the beginning of the war they were episodic in nature, then later, with the creation of partisan headquarters, they began to be united by a common plan and grew into the form of large operations, coordinated in time and place with the operations of the active army.

Putting sabotage on enemy communications in first place among other types of guerrilla actions, the TsShPD explained this for a number of reasons: the small number of participants and the necessary means compared to other types of operations; small losses of partisans compared to the enemy; the diversion of significant enemy forces to guard their communications, which reduced the enemy’s ability to conduct active operations against the partisans. Wider choice of locations for operations compared to other types of actions, for example, the defeat of garrisons.

To work on enemy communications, the partisans had a variety of mine-explosive and incendiary equipment. Using mines and land mines weighing from 200 g to 10 kg, small groups of partisan saboteurs derailed military trains. In this case, not only the force of the explosion was taken into account, but also the kinetic energy of the train, which increased the destruction of the rolling stock. Tank or infantry battalions, which had a certain strength in battle, were completely helpless against a mine laid by a small group of guerrilla miners or a lone saboteur.

An important role was assigned to small sabotage and reconnaissance groups, which, as a rule, were assigned to certain sections of the railways, where they operated for a long time. Sabotage groups usually moved during the day in forests, and at night along fields and field roads, observing security and reconnaissance measures. They avoided populated areas and clashes with the enemy until they reached the designated sabotage site. If the groups were led by experienced and determined commanders, they were elusive. When encountering the enemy, they tried to break away from him, often using minefields and delayed-action grenades. Thus, on the territory of the Vitebsk region, starting in the fall of 1942, about 16 special groups operated to carry out work, including sabotage. For example, the Nevsky group (leader F. Novikov) operated in the Vitebsk and Polotsk regions. During the sabotage, 5 enemy trains were blown up, more than 500 German soldiers and officers were destroyed. 1 highway bridge was blown up, reconnaissance information was received about the situation behind enemy lines. Having completed the task and expended ammunition, the Nevsky special group left the front line in December 1942. In January 1943, the special group again went behind enemy lines.

"Rail War". In July 1943, the TsShPD developed a plan for an operation called the “Rail War,” the goal of which was to launch simultaneous widespread attacks on the enemy’s railways with their complete disorganization and disruption of the enemy’s operations at the fronts. July 14, 1943 The TSSHPD was sent to the headquarters of republican and regional formations special order “On guerrilla “rail war” on enemy communications”. In Belarus, 32 representatives of the Central Shpd were sent to the partisans; from July 16 to August 5, Belarusian partisans received 144 tons of cargo from the Soviet rear, including 36.5 tons of cargo, 522 mines, 35 anti-tank guns, fuses, etc. In addition, the TsShPD were involved in the operation Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol and part of the Ukrainian partisans were involved - a total of 167 brigades and separate detachments. Each of them was assigned areas and objects of action.

The implementation of the “Rail War” plan began on the night of August 3, 1943, when about 74 thousand Belarusian partisans dealt a powerful blow to the occupiers’ railway communications during the Soviet counteroffensive near Kursk and continued until mid-September 1943. Only Belarusian partisans during The “Rail War” blew up 836 trains and 6,345 wagons, platforms and fuel tanks, destroyed 184 railway bridges, 556 bridges on highways and dirt roads, destroyed 119 tanks and armored vehicles, 1,430 motor vehicles and defeated 44 enemy garrisons. 167 partisan brigades with a total number of 95,615 people were involved in this operation. The sections Polotsk - Molodechno, Minsk - Bobruisk, Luninets - Kalinkovichi and Mogilev - Zhlobin suffered the most significant destruction.

IN September 1943 By decision of the TsShPD, a repeated operation began to destroy the enemy’s railways, which received the name "Concert". It was timed to coincide with the Battle of the Dnieper and took place from September 19 to the end of October 1943. 183 partisan brigades and detachments with a total number of 120,600 people were involved in its implementation. As a result, 148,500 rails were blown up, including more than 90 thousand rails on the territory of Belarus. The massive destruction of communications made it possible to reduce the capacity of railways behind enemy lines by 40% and thwarted his plans to transport and concentrate troops, accumulate reserves and materiel, significantly complicated the maneuvering of forces and thereby contributed to the advance of the fronts of our troops.

IN December 1943 Another operation was carried out to destroy enemy communications, which received the name "Winter Concert", according to which “in the conditions of the winter offensive of the Red Army, a repetition of a massive simultaneous attack on the railways will put the enemy in even worse conditions and may turn out to be one of the decisive elements in the final defeat of the German army.” In connection with the disbandment of the TsShPD, its implementation was entrusted to the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement.

Simultaneously with the destruction of the railway tracks, Operation Desert on the disruption of water supply to railway stations. As a result, about 37 water pumps were put out of action on the territory of Belarus (only 27% of the planned plan). According to the operational department of the TsShPD, the 100% implementation of this operation was prevented by its coincidence in time with the “rail war”. This was a good addition to Operations Rail War, Concert and Winter Concert.

The final stage in undermining the functionality of the enemy’s railway lines on the territory of Belarus was the summer of 1944. According to the plan, “the operation should begin immediately, keeping it in the strictest confidence; make the first explosion on the night of June 20. In the future, deliver continuous strikes, achieving complete disruption of enemy transports...” As a result, “pursuing the main goal of disrupting enemy transport of troops, equipment and other cargo, the partisans, overcoming minefields on the approaches to the railway. highways and fighting with German security units, with a powerful simultaneous blow they blew up 400,775 rails only on the night of June 20, 1944, i.e. three days before the start of the offensive of the front troops...”

Thus, sabotage operations carried out by partisans in the occupied territory of Belarus worked quite effectively and thereby provided assistance in conducting various operations by regular units of the Red Army, including Operation Bagration to liberate Belarusian lands.

Partisan intelligence. Guerrilla reconnaissance did not immediately become effective. In 1941 and early 1942, almost all partisan detachments conducted reconnaissance in their own interests, and only a relatively small number of partisan detachments and groups, partisan reconnaissance, underground organizations and their agents conducted reconnaissance for the army. This period, in addition to the development and growth of the partisan movement and intelligence work of the partisans, is also characterized by errors in the organization and conduct of this matter. The biggest drawback of the initial period was the extremely weak radio communication with partisan detachments.

Subsequently, with the development of the partisan movement and the organization of governing bodies, partisan intelligence began to gain momentum. The tasks and principles of partisan intelligence activities were set out in order No. 000 of September 5, 1942, which became the program of the partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War.

The main form of partisan intelligence was military intelligence, which was divided into two main types - military and intelligence. The military was carried out by special units of partisan forces of various sizes, intended to obtain information about the enemy by capturing prisoners, documents, samples of military equipment, as well as interviewing the local population and observation.

There were three types of military intelligence structure: 1) all military intelligence was concentrated in platoons within detachments, and the brigade headquarters was limited to defining tasks and processing incoming materials; 2) a special reconnaissance detachment was created in the brigade, which provided the brigade headquarters with information, or the detachments had special reconnaissance sections, and at the brigade headquarters there was a strong, well-armed company. Within this structural framework, the reconnaissance work of the brigade and detachments complemented each other; 3) to coordinate reconnaissance work, there was a small reconnaissance group at the brigade headquarters, and in the detachments there were military reconnaissance platoons, which made it possible for the brigade headquarters to control and double-check the most valuable information received from the detachments and carry out on their own some of the most complex special reconnaissance tasks.

Human intelligence was carried out by partisan intelligence officers who infiltrated various enemy bodies, formations, enterprises and transport in order to obtain data of interest using various methods, mainly conspiratorial. Thus, V. Kozlov’s Minsk connection covered with its agent network more than 500 towns and large settlements and cities located on important railway and highway communications, including: Minsk, Slutsk, Bobruisk, Dzerzhinsk, Starye Dorogi, Negoreloye, Osipovichi and others, where there were a total of 2,192 agents and informants. In Minsk itself alone, there were at least 6,500 agents from various brigades, detachments and reconnaissance groups surrounding the city.

There were three intelligence networks: through the deputy commanders of detachments and reconnaissance brigades; heads of special departments of partisan formations, military long-range reconnaissance, groups of which had contact only with patriots known to them, as well as directly subordinate to regional intelligence agencies.

In addition, messengers were an important component in the partisan intelligence system. According to the BSPA data, as of July 1, 1944, 19 thousand messengers were registered.

It should be noted that reconnaissance was carried out in several directions: reconnaissance of the enemy’s intentions; reconnaissance of the composition and deployment of enemy formations and units; exploration of new types of weapons and means of combat; reconnaissance of defensive lines and structures; reconnaissance of airfields of enemy aviation forces and air defense systems, etc.

Intelligence about the enemy was received by the intelligence department of the TsShPD from subordinate headquarters in the form of reports, special messages, protocols, interrogations of prisoners, captured enemy documents and radiograms from individual partisan formations and detachments. All information received was processed and sent to the Operational and Intelligence Departments of the General Staff of the Red Army, as well as to the commanders of the relevant fronts. And intelligence data, which is of particular importance, is in the State Defense Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Guerrilla raids. In accordance with the TsShPD plan to implement the GKO order of September 5, 1942, partisan raids began on enemy rear lines, which became one of the most effective forms of activity. Their main tasks were the development of the partisan movement in new regions; attacks on the most important targets in the enemy rear, mainly on his communications; direct assistance to the Red Army; intelligence and introduction of agents; defeat of small enemy garrisons: destruction of traitors and, of course, a safe exit from enemy attacks.

Guerrilla raids were carried out both in large formations and in small groups. The number of participants depended on the task at hand, geographical conditions and the general situation. The number of large formations reached several thousand people, and small groups did not exceed 13–15 people. The average duration of the raids was 2–4 months. In preparation for them, plans for their implementation were carefully developed, and material support was prepared. Movement outside the partisan zone or region occurred at night. Large formations moved in several columns along parallel routes. At the same time, artillery, convoys and medical units moved in the center of the columns. During the day, when enemy aviation was operating, movement of detachments outside forest areas was impossible. They, camouflaged, occupied a perimeter defense, set up ambushes and outposts, rested in gullies, groves or populated areas, far from enemy communications. In winter, day trips were carried out mainly in populated areas. The objectives of outposts and ambushes set up 5 - 6 km from the location of the formation (detachment) were to force the enemy to deploy as far as possible from the camp site in order to ascertain the enemy’s strength and enable the formation to take the necessary measures to organize a perimeter defense. Of great importance in this case was the reserve, in which up to 1/3 of the strength of the formation's combat personnel was left. The reserve was intended to break through the encirclement of the formation's parking area and concentrate the main part of the formation. And far from the formation's location, distracting sabotage and reconnaissance groups usually operated. Staying longer than a day in one place was allowed only if the enemy did not “grope” the partisans or did not have sufficient forces to attack. When crossing railways or highways, mines and land mines were widely used, which were laid in front of the outposts. When trains or vehicles carrying enemy troops were blown up, machine gunners from the partisan barrier finished off the enemy manpower remaining after the transport crash, captured and destroyed the cargo being transported.

The most common types of raids among Belarusian partisans are raids along a closed route (circular) with a return to an earlier place of deployment; tactical raids to relocate to new areas of operation; reconnaissance raids. So, 300 km. a ring raid was carried out on the territory of Sennensky, Bogushevsky, Vitebsky, Beshenkovichsky, Chashniksky, Lepelsky and Kholopinechsky districts at the end of January - April 1943 by the 1st brigade named after K. Zaslonov for the purpose of agitation and propaganda work.

Combat activities together with regular units of the Red Army. In June 1944, the Red Army launched a major offensive in Belarus. It was combined with attacks by Belarusian partisans on enemy communications, which caused massive train crashes and rail explosions. The number of their formations reached 240 thousand people. They, together with the advancing units of the Red Army, occupied the cities of Vileika, Molodechno, Slutsk and many regional centers of the republic. During the preparation for this operation, partisan units conducted active reconnaissance. During the entire operation, they crashed 3,625 enemy trains and captured about 45 thousand enemy soldiers, officers and several generals. The actions of the Belarusian partisans were of great operational and strategic importance in defeating the Germans in this operation.

In total, during the war years, over 1.3 million partisans, who were part of 6,200 partisan formations, participated directly in the armed struggle in the rear of the Nazi occupiers.

7.4. False partisan detachments on the territory of Belarus

The Nazis did everything to discredit the partisan movement in the eyes of the civilian population. German propaganda portrayed them as “Stalinist-Jewish degenerates” fighting against their own people and their real liberators – the Germans. The greatest danger was posed by false partisan detachments created by the occupiers themselves.

Their representatives, under the guise of “partisans,” were sent to those areas where the partisans were most active. The time frame for the formation of the detachments was different; it depended on personnel selection, which at the final stage was carried out exclusively by German officers. The detachments were mainly recruited from the population of the occupied territories, prisoners of war, criminals and persons recruited to serve in the German state security agencies. The training of the detachments varied - from 3 months to six months. During this period, in various schools for training intelligence officers, saboteurs and terrorists, future “partisans” studied subversive work, working with toxic substances, underwent additional military training, and those who were especially trusted by the German intelligence services were allowed to study the specialty of a radio operator. The armament of such detachments consisted of both German models and captured rifles and machine guns of the Red Army. On average, one group relied on 1 - 2 machine guns, a walkie-talkie with a range of up to 80 km, rifles and machine guns for each member of the squad. The detachment was supplied with food for 1 - 2 weeks; it was believed that during this time the false partisan detachment would begin to expropriate food from local residents or receive support from real partisans.

An example of a false partisan formation is the reconnaissance and punitive group "SD", created in November 1942, which by April 1942 was reorganized into a detachment, which by that time numbered about 70 people. From April to May 1942, the detachment operated in the Luga district of the Leningrad region, from May to September - in Novorzhevsky, in September and October - in Ostrovsky, from October 1943 to February 1944 - in Sebezhsky, from February to March 1944 g. - in Ostrovsky and Pytalovsky districts of the Pskov region.

The members of this detachment, which by that time was called the “Jagd Team,” used exclusively insidious methods of fighting Soviet partisans. All of them were dressed in civilian uniform, and N. Martynovsky, the leader of this group, wore the uniform of a captain of the Red Army and the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Punishers, posing as partisans, when identifying persons who provided assistance to the partisans, carried out executions, burned populated areas, and robbed property from Soviet citizens. Captured partisans were shot, and some were drawn into the “Jagd Team”, and to secure their further service with the punitive forces they were forced to shoot their own comrades in front of the line. For passive actions during operations, cowardice, the slightest dissatisfaction, attempts to go over to the side of the partisans, N. Martynovsky or his deputy Reshetnikov shot the members of the detachment in front of the formation.

In March 1944, the “Jagd Team” was transferred to the territory of Belarus, where they committed mass atrocities against peaceful Soviet citizens in the Polotsk and Drissa regions. So, on May 1, 1944, in the town of Kryshborok, punitive forces, motivated by revenge for the platoon commander Pshik killed by partisans, shot 30 innocent children, women and old people. In total, about 60 civilians and partisans were shot in this area.

At the end of 1944, the Jagd Command was transferred to Poland and then to Yugoslavia to fight the partisan movement. In January 1945, near the city of Inowroclaw (Poland), it was defeated by the Red Army. 39 punitive forces were captured, arrested and convicted by a military tribunal. 10 of them were shot.

Thus, in many cases these false partisan detachments were quickly identified by the partisans and destroyed. But during their actions they managed to discredit the partisan movement in the eyes of the local population. For this purpose, the “partisans” carried out bandit raids on villages and villages, during which they burned houses, robbed the population, killed residents, etc.

7.5. Partisan zones

A characteristic feature of the partisan struggle in the rear of the Nazi leadership is its offensive nature, which was most clearly manifested in the combat operations of partisan detachments and brigades to destroy garrisons, police stations, gendarme posts, etc. As a result, the occupation authorities were forced to retreat, thereby thereby liberating the territory that later fell under the control of the partisans, who went down in history as partisan zones - military-economic and political bridgeheads, bases for the development of further resistance.

According to the TsShPD, by the beginning of 1943, the partisans held more than 15 thousand and controlled about 50 thousand km2 of the territory of Belarus, which amounted to almost a third of its area; at the end of 1943, they controlled 108 thousand km2, or 58.4% of the occupied territory of the republic, including 37.8% thousand km2 that was cleared from the enemy.

There were more than 20 large partisan zones: Oktyabrsko-Lyubanskaya, Borisovsko-Begomlskaya, Klichevskaya, Polotsk-Lepelskaya, Rossonsko-Osveiskaya, Ivenetsko-Nalibokskaya, Sennensko-Orshanskaya, Surazhskaya and others with a large population. Thus, the Polotsk-Lepel partisan zone in October 1943 included 1,220 settlements with 70 thousand people, and in January 1944 there were more than 100 thousand people.

Let us consider, using the example of the Polotsk-Lepel zone, the fourth on the territory of Belarus, the activities of such entities controlled by partisan formations.

Thus, the Polotsk-Lepel partisan zone was created in the fall of 1942. It included Ushachsky, part of the Lepelsky, Vetrinsky, Beshenkovichsky and Polotsk districts of the Vitebsk region and the Plisa district of the Vileika region. Security was carried out by the Polotsk-Lepel partisan unit, which at the end of 1943 included the brigade named after V. Lenin, named after V. Chapaev, 2nd Ushachskaya named after P. Ponomarenko, Lepelskaya named after I. Stalin, named after K. Voroshilov, “Aleksey”, “For Soviet Belarus”, named after the Komsomol, named after S. Korotkin, 16th Smolensk and Smolensk Partisan Regiment, 1st Anti-Fascist, named after the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)B, “October”, 1st named after Suvorov, named after V. Lenin Vileika region, numbering 17.5 thousand people. By the end of 1943, the partisans were armed with 21 cannons, 143 mortars, 151 anti-tank rifles, 721 machine guns, 1,544 machine guns, and 9,344 rifles. The leadership was carried out by the partisan command, reporting directly to the operational group of the Central Committee of the CP(b)B and the BSPD, led by V. Lobank.

In addition, fortifications were erected on the borders of the zone for all-round defense. With the help of the local population, a 287 km defensive line with a system of trenches, pillboxes, and minefields was built along the Western Dvina from Ulla to Polotsk, as well as along the railway from Polotsk to Krulevshchizna.

This zone was the base and rear for partisan formations. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, in the village of Starinka, Ushachi district, “the partisan headquarters and hospital were located. They fired Molotov cocktails at our village. They’ll slap you on the hut, and there’s nothing you can do to put it out. There was a group of demolition workers in our hut. One group will go to the railway for several days, return, and then another will leave. The partisans did not allow the Germans to live.” There was two-way radio communication with the mainland. Weapons, ammunition, medicine, etc. were delivered to partisan airfields and landing sites built in 1942–1943.

In addition, two turpentine and tar factories, 80 forging and metalworking, 54 tanning and 47 carpentry workshops, a pottery factory, several workshops for the repair and production of partisan weapons, shoes, and clothing were restored. Three power plants and 6 mills operated in the zone. Flaxseed was processed at 20 oil factories. Spring sowing and harvesting took place.

Much attention was paid to medical support for the partisans and the population. Hospitals were created in each of the detachments, and outpatient clinics were created for the population.

The Nazis constantly tried to regain lost lands through punitive operations. The Polotsk-Lepel zone was no exception in this regard. In December 1943 - February 1944, the Nazis tried to break through the defense five times, but the partisans repelled the attacks. Having failed to achieve success, the fascist German invaders organized punitive operations “Spring Festival” and “Downpour”. Against the partisans and civilians, the Nazis deployed forces of 6 divisions, 137 tanks, 235 guns, 70 aircraft, 2 armored trains.

On April 11, 1944, the punitive operation began. The partisans took up defense along a perimeter that reached 240 km, against 60 thousand Germans. Particularly difficult battles began to occur on April 18, 1944. Thus, on April 23, the Nazis threw about a thousand infantry, 4 tanks, 2 aircraft into the battle for the village of Kazimirovka against the Alexey brigade. Only after six hours of battle, when the enemy was supported by 50 bombers, did the partisans abandon their positions.

According to the recollections of eyewitnesses: “The Germans walked in a chain through the forest. Some will pass, and others will follow. My brother and a friend dug a hole in the forest and put a Christmas tree with roots on top. We heard the Germans pass nearby several times. They decided: if they were spotted by the “shovanka”, they would blow up the grenade. They had one grenade between them... All the people were driven out of the forest near the village of Zamoshye. There the Germans gathered us and drove us to Ushachi. They re-sorted: those who are older and stronger - to the right, children - to the left. My brother and father were sent to Germany. When they were transported across the Bug, they managed to escape and came home on foot. But they drove us into Barkovshchina and released us. We returned and the house burned down, only the bathhouse near the bushes. Near Selishche there was a river Poperina, so the water flowed red with blood. A sea of ​​people died there. They were fleeing, and the Germans were shooting and beating, beating... Here, near our forest, so many partisans lay beaten! Some were identified and some were not. Only two weeks later they allowed the remains to be brought to our cemetery, there, in a mass grave, they were buried...”

The partisans were assisted by the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, who with local battles drew off the punitive troops. Front aviation made 354 sorties, bombed concentrations of German troops, transported more than 250 tons of cargo to the partisans, and took out about 1,500 wounded and sick.

On April 27, 1944, the Nazis narrowed the encirclement to 20 km near Ushachi. On April 30, 1944, the command of the Polotsk-Lepel partisan zone, after agreement with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the BSPD and the command of the 1st Baltic Front, gave the order to the partisan detachments that had been defending the zone for 25 days to make a breakthrough. The Smolensk partisan regiment, partisan brigades named after the Komsomol, 16th Smolenskaya, 1st Anti-Fascist, named after Voroshilov and others broke through the enemy encirclement on May 5 and brought about 15 thousand local residents out of the blockade. According to the memoirs: “When we all fled during the breakthrough, both partisans and civilians joined the ranks of the Germans. But there were tanks there, machine guns, and the Germans were visible and invisible. But there was no other salvation for us but to run to the attack and shout: “Hurray!” The Germans were taken aback, confused, and the machine guns fell silent. I saw with my own eyes how the commander of a youth partisan detachment, with a tablet on his side, jumped out at a German officer. He seemed numb from surprise. Our guy hit him in the forehead with a rifle butt and ran on. The German rolled into a ditch... It was only the Germans who fired first and then, at the tail, after the huge crowd. And when we mixed with them, no one shot. One girl came to us and wanted to hide with us, but the hole was too small. This girl is still alive. When everyone was running, she fell and hid under the dead man, smearing herself with blood. The Germans walked around and finished off the wounded. But they didn't notice her. Apparently, it’s her destiny to live...”

As a result of the 25-day battle, there were significant losses among the punitive forces: 8.3 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, about 12.9 thousand were wounded, 59 tanks, 116 vehicles, 7 armored vehicles, 22 guns, 2 aircraft were destroyed.

Thus, the existence of partisan zones made it possible, on the one hand, for the local population to survive in the brutal conditions of the Nazi occupation, and on the other hand, to liberate the territory of Belarus from the Nazis as much as possible, thereby making it easier for the regular units of the Red Army in the future.

7.6. Underground struggle: organizational structure, composition, forms and methods

Underground organizations and groups on the territory of Belarus began to operate in all fairly large populated areas almost from the first days of its occupation. They were created in different ways: but in most cases independently. These groups and organizations established connections with each other, created governing bodies - underground city party committees (for example, Gomel, Minsk) or underground patriotic organizations led by communists or non-party members (Osipovichi, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Obol, Orsha, etc.).

In addition to the above mentioned underground organizations, underground groups of the LKSMB (Leninist Communist Youth Union of Belarus) were also created, mainly on a territorial basis, largely copying the structure of underground party bodies. As a rule, they were located with partisan detachments and brigades. The composition of the regional committees of the LKSMB was small. As a rule, there were 2 - 4 secretaries, from 3 to 10 members of the regional committee, 1 - 3 instructors for underground work. Some committees included lecturers and editors of underground youth newspapers, as well as liaison officers who were not part of the regular staff of the regional committees. For the purpose of more efficient management, the regions were divided into zones, and each was assigned a regional committee employee who was responsible for the development of the youth movement. So, in October 1943, Vileika region. was divided into central, northern and southeastern zones. The Vitebsk regional committee of the LKSMB divided the region into 4 bushes, to which one of the regional committee members, two instructors and messengers were assigned, where they constantly carried out work. In January 1943, the Central Committee of the LKSMB approved the “Memo for the Assistant Commissar for Komsomol of a Partisan Detachment,” which defined the tasks of Komsomol organizations of partisan detachments, their structure and procedure for admission to the Komsomol, and clearly stated the functions of assistant commissars for Komsomol. This greatly contributed to the organizational strengthening of Komsomol organizations.

Like the partisan formations, the underground was also engaged in sabotage, combat and political activities. In addition, already in the first months of the occupation, the underground sabotaged various activities of the invaders. The methods of their activities were very different: concealing their professions, damaging equipment and tools, not going to work on time, hiding the harvest, agricultural equipment, etc. Acts of sabotage inflicted significant losses on the enemy, which weakened his strength and eased the position of the Red Army.

One of the most numerous and effective was the underground in the Vitebsk region. It consisted of over 200 organizations and groups. Among the underground members of the region are Heroes of the Soviet Union K. Zaslonov (leader of the Orsha underground), V. Horuzhaya (leader of the Vitebsk city underground group), Z. Portnova and F. Zenkova (participants of the underground Komsomol group at Obol station, Shumilinsky district), T. Marinenko (Participant of the Polotsk underground), P. Masherov and V. Khomchenovsky (leader and participant of the Rossony underground organization).

In total, in Vitebsk itself during 1941 - 1944. There were about 6 6 underground groups (about 1,550 people), which were led by the Vitebsk underground regional committee and the city committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus and the Leninist Young Communist League of Youth, over 70 groups (250 communists and 300 non-party people) numbered the underground of Orsha and the Orsha region, on the territory of the Lepel There were about 24 underground groups (250 people) operating in the district.

Under the leadership of the Vitebsk underground regional committee of the CP(b)B and the Polotsk underground RK CP(b)B, from August 1941 to October 1942, 11 groups (about 160 people) operated on the territory of Polotsk and the Polotsk region.

The first underground groups in Polotsk were led by Y. Stashkevich, P. Samorodkov, S. Sukhovey, underground groups in the villages of Domniki - A. Filipov, Dretun - M. Sviridenko, Zalesye - K. Makarov, Kazimirovo - F. Maksimov, Polota - P. Stashkevich, Works - A. Marchenko, Prisoners - P. Kirylenko, Yurovichi - D. Zublev.

Thus, by the end of 1942, the underground organization “Fearless” was organized, headed by the director of Orphanage No. 1 M. Forinko. The bureau of this group consisted of 5 people - M. Forinko, M. Lyutko, V. Latko, N. Vanyushin, S. Markovich. An oath of discipline, secrecy and steadfastness in all situations was taken. In addition, an active group (14 people) was selected and approved from senior pupils - pioneers of Orphanage No. 1 in Polotsk.

We cannot ignore the operation called “Zvezdochka”, carried out by the “Fearless” group together with the Ushachi underground district party committee (secretary I. Korenevsky), commander of the brigade named after. Chapaev V. Melnikov, the task force of the Polotsk-Lepel partisan zone V. Lobank and with the Popkovsky special group from military unit No. 0112 of the 1st Baltic Front, to rescue the children of Orphanage No. 1 of Polotsk. As a result, the children were rescued and taken out of their cities.

In addition to these largest underground organizations, the fight against the enemy on the territory of the Vitebsk region was carried out by patriots of Bogushevsky, Braslav, Verkhnedvinsky, Dokshitsky, Dubrovensky, Lioznensky, Postavsky, Sennensky, Surazhsky, Chashniksky, Sharkovshchinsky districts.

In the western regions of Belarus, forces with different political orientations acted against the occupiers, which was the result of the recent existence of two different state systems there. In this region arose anti-Nazi organizations 16

The partisan movement has repeatedly proven its effectiveness during wars. The Germans were afraid of Soviet partisans. The “people's avengers” destroyed communications, blew up bridges, took “tongues” and even made weapons themselves.

History of the concept

Partisan is a word that came into Russian from the Italian language, in which the word partigiano means a member of an irregular military detachment that enjoys the support of the population and politicians. Partisans fight using specific means: war behind enemy lines, sabotage or sabotage. A distinctive feature of guerrilla tactics is covert movement across enemy territory and good knowledge of the terrain. In Russia and the USSR, such tactics have been practiced for centuries. Suffice it to recall the War of 1812.

In the 1930s in the USSR, the word “partisan” acquired a positive connotation - only partisans who supported the Red Army were called that way. Since then, in Russia this word has been exclusively positive and is almost never used in relation to enemy partisan groups - they are called terrorists or illegal military formations.

Soviet partisans

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet partisans were controlled by authorities and performed tasks similar to the army. But if the army fought at the front, then the partisans had to destroy enemy lines of communication and means of communication.

During the war years, 6,200 partisan detachments operated in the occupied lands of the USSR, in which approximately a million people took part. They were managed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, developing coordinated tactics for disparate partisan associations and directing them towards common goals.

In 1942, Marshal of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, and they were asked to create a partisan army behind enemy lines - German troops. Despite the fact that partisans are often thought of as randomly organized detachments of the local population, the “people's avengers” behaved in accordance with the rules of strict military discipline and took the oath as real soldiers - otherwise they would not survive in the brutal conditions of war.

Life of a partisan

The worst time for the Soviet partisans, who were forced to hide in the forests and mountains, was in winter. Before this, not a single partisan movement in the world had encountered the problem of cold; in addition to the difficulties of survival, there was the problem of camouflage. The partisans left traces in the snow, and the vegetation no longer hid their shelters. Winter dwellings often harmed the mobility of partisans: in Crimea they built mainly above-ground dwellings like wigwams. In other areas, dugouts predominated.

Many partisan headquarters had a radio station, with the help of which they contacted Moscow and transmitted news to the local population in the occupied territories. Using radio, the command ordered the partisans, and they, in turn, coordinated airstrikes and provided intelligence information.

There were also women among the partisans - if for the Germans, who thought of women only in the kitchen, this was unacceptable, the Soviets did their best to encourage the weaker sex to participate in the partisan war. Female intelligence officers did not come under the suspicion of enemies, female doctors and radio operators helped during sabotage, and some brave women even took part in hostilities. It is also known about officer privileges - if there was a woman in the detachment, she often became the “camp wife” of the commanders. Sometimes everything happened the other way around and wives commanded instead of husbands and interfered in military matters - the highest authorities tried to stop such disorder.

Guerrilla tactics

The basis of the “long arm” tactics (as the Soviet leadership called the partisans) was the implementation of reconnaissance and sabotage - they destroyed railways along which the Germans delivered trains with weapons and food, broke high-voltage lines, poisoned water pipes or wells behind enemy lines.

Thanks to these actions, it was possible to disorganize the enemy's rear and demoralize him. The great advantage of the partisans was also that all of the above did not require large human resources: sometimes even a small detachment and sometimes one person could implement subversive plans.
When the Red Army advanced, the partisans struck from the rear, breaking through the defenses and unexpectedly disrupting the enemy's regrouping or retreat. Before this, the forces of the partisan detachments were hidden in forests, mountains and swamps - in the steppe regions the activities of the partisans were ineffective.

The guerrilla war was especially successful in Belarus - forests and swamps hid the “second front” and contributed to their successes. That’s why the exploits of the partisans are still remembered in Belarus: it’s worth remembering at least the name of the Minsk football club of the same name.
With the help of propaganda in the occupied territories, the “people's avengers” were able to replenish the fighting ranks. However, partisan detachments were recruited unevenly - part of the population in the occupied territories kept their nose to the wind and waited, while other people, familiar with the terror of the German occupiers, were more willing to join the partisans

Rail War

The “Second Front,” as the German invaders called the partisans, played a huge role in destroying the enemy. In Belarus in 1943 there was a decree “On the destruction of the enemy’s railway communications using the method of rail warfare” - the partisans were supposed to wage a so-called rail war, blowing up trains, bridges and damaging enemy tracks in every possible way.

During operations “Rail War” and “Concert” in Belarus, train traffic was stopped for 15-30 days, and the enemy’s army and equipment were destroyed. Blowing up enemy trains even with a shortage of explosives, the partisans destroyed more than 70 bridges and killed 30 thousand German soldiers. On the first night of Operation Rail War alone, 42 thousand rails were destroyed. It is believed that during the entire war, the partisans destroyed about 18 thousand enemy troops, which is a truly colossal figure.

In many ways, these achievements became a reality thanks to the invention of the partisan craftsman T.E. Shavgulidze - in field conditions, he built a special wedge that derailed trains: the train ran over a wedge, which was attached to the tracks in a few minutes, then the wheel was moved from the inside to the outside of the rail, and the train was completely destroyed, which did not happen even after mine explosions .

Partisan gunsmiths

Partisan brigades were mainly armed with light machine guns, machine guns and carbines. However, there were detachments with mortars or artillery. The partisans armed themselves with Soviets and often captured weapons, but this was not enough in the conditions of war behind enemy lines.

The partisans launched a large-scale production of handicraft weapons and even tanks. Local workers created special secret workshops - with primitive equipment and a small set of tools, however, engineers and amateur technicians managed to create excellent examples of weapon parts from scrap metal and improvised parts.

In addition to repairs, the partisans were also involved in design work: “A large number of homemade mines, machine guns and grenades of the partisans have an original solution for both the entire structure as a whole and its individual components. Not limiting themselves to “local” inventions, the partisans sent a large number of inventions and rationalization proposals to the mainland.”

The most popular homemade weapons were homemade PPSh submachine guns - the first of which was made in the “Razgrom” partisan brigade near Minsk in 1942. The partisans also made “surprises” with explosives and unexpected types of mines with a special detonator, the secret of which was known only to their own. The “People's Avengers” easily repaired even blown-up German tanks and even organized artillery divisions from the repaired mortars. Partisan engineers even made grenade launchers.

Thousands of trains were blown up. On no section of the railway network was the total delay less than three days, and some lines were not operational throughout August...

Thanks to many similar tricks, the Ukrainian partisans accurately disabled not just rails, but trains. Naturally, Starinov was indignant when he found out: the partisans of Belarus in 1944 blew up almost exclusively roads, without hunting for what was moving along them. The partisans looked for a lot at the sites of former battles or retreats of the regular army. Explosives were mostly smelted from unexploded shells. At that time, mixtures with aluminum powder were used almost exclusively in torpedoes and aerial bombs, refractory hexogen was used in armor-piercing shells, and the usual contents of an artillery landmine could be melted in a water or steam bath. The master, who managed not to die during the first couple of dozen experiments, accumulated the necessary skill for further work without unacceptable risk.

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Explosive means—detonators, fire and detonating cords, electrical wires—have always been in constant short supply. There is nothing to hope for trophies: engineer depots in the rear are rare. There is nothing to be found on the battlefields: the retreating troops use all such equipment to undermine faulty equipment and important structures such as bridges. The only supply route is from the “mainland” by air. But they couldn’t deliver much: flying behind enemy lines is much more difficult and riskier than walking.

Agree, it’s a pity to waste such rare materials to undermine rails that can be replaced in a matter of hours (and with proper training of the train personnel, in minutes). Especially if we take into account the following fact: the continuation of the “Rail War” - Operation Concert, launched on September 19, 1943 - stalled by the end of October precisely because of the depletion of stocks of sapper equipment.

Why, in 1944, did not Belarus apply the experience of hunting for trains, accumulated by the successes of 1943?

In the spring of 1943, the location of the summer battles was determined. Only on the flanks of the Kursk Bulge could the Germans hope for radical success with the encirclement of a significant Soviet group. Accordingly, the most powerful system of defensive structures in the entire Soviet history arose there. We had to aim the counteroffensive primarily at Kyiv: the conditions of the road networks and the entire terrain did not allow us to develop a similar speed of advance or achieve comparable political and economic results in other sectors of the front.

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The troops of both sides concentrated in advance in the area of ​​​​the upcoming hostilities. Directly during the battles, mainly ammunition was transported. True, the relatively few echelons were well guarded. But several detachments hunted for each train at once, and its explosion thoroughly destroyed the tracks.

In 1944, the Germans were expecting a strike on the flanks of the Belarusian “balcony”. After all, behind its center stretched the Pripyat swamps. In 1941, the Germans themselves did not even try to pass them: Army Group “Center” moved to the south, “North” - naturally, to the north. And now they have strengthened the flanks and concentrated all available reserves there.

Ours decided to break through the Germans - through the swamps. We found old-timers who knew the trails. The sappers spent several months learning how to guide log roads, and the tankers learned how to drive along invisible logs, guided by sapper poles. The infantry mastered swamp shoes woven from branches: a significant area of ​​support slowed down the fall into the quagmire.

The carrying capacity of each path - even with a laid road - is small. We had to disperse along all acceptable passages. The Germans were famous for their ability to transfer reserves and beat the enemy piece by piece. Having brought noticeably superior forces to one pass, they would have defeated the Soviet troops marching there with almost no losses of their own and moved on to the next.

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The partisans certainly would not have been able to destroy many echelons of German troops. The Germans also took into account the experience of 1943 and improved the security of trains, even managing to inspect the tracks before they passed. But there could not be enough German forces to protect the entire railway network. The Rail War paralyzed German movements for several days. Our troops managed to pass through the swamp corridors, group up and attack the Germans from the rear. German irretrievable losses exceeded ours by one and a half times.

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Colonel Starinov, a subversive saboteur, proposed conducting large-scale guerrilla operations on the enemy's railway communications during the Second World War. His ideas found support from the head of the TsShPD (Central Headquarters), Lieutenant General Ponomarenko, who presented them to Stalin and received approval for their implementation.

The large-scale guerrilla sabotage was called “Operation Rail War.” It was decided to carry it out before the most important strategic battle. On the eve of this battle, the balance of forces of the opponents was approximately equal. The outcome of the battle depended to a large extent on how successfully the maneuver was carried out by the troops, how reserves were used and, most importantly, how conditions were provided for supplying the army with everything necessary.

"Rail War" was a prepared event. The number of trained demolition specialists and instructors has increased in training centers and partisan schools.

To disable the entire enemy's railway infrastructure on the scale that was planned, a huge number of fuses and explosives themselves were required, which the partisans did not have. The detachments were supplied with the help of long-range aviation forces.

The “Rail War” was planned to be carried out on a front whose length was one thousand kilometers from north to south and seven hundred and fifty kilometers from west to east inland. The sabotage was supposed to be carried out in three stages, each of which was supposed to last fifteen to thirty days.

The "Rail War" began in 1943, on August 3rd. Seventy-four thousand partisans simultaneously attacked enemy communications.

Ponomarenko, taking advantage of Starinov’s ideas, subsequently developed his own plan for carrying out subversive measures. Ponomarenko believed that risky attacks on enemy echelons were inappropriate. In his opinion, it was enough to carry out targeted strikes on the railway itself, blowing up the rails with small charges. Thus, it was planned to create a shortage of railway tracks for the Germans and a collapse of the transport system before the Battle of Kursk.

Starinov, in turn, defended his point of view, arguing that it was the enemy’s echelons that had a strategic purpose. Moreover, damaged rails are quite easy to restore compared to repairing damage from a train wreck. This would lead to much more widespread destruction and disruption of traffic.

As a result, Starinov was sent to the Ukrainian headquarters, and Ponomarenko continued to implement his plan.

Not without traditional Soviet formalism. Ponomarenko established a certain plan for the partisan detachments regarding the number of undermined rails. It should be noted that this approach did more harm. The order mentioned the undermining of not only the main, but also backup, as well as poorly or not at all guarded routes. As a result, many commanders chose to blow up unimportant routes, unexploited branches.

At the same time, the Germans quickly learned to restore “pinpoint damage”, which, it must be said, was usually no more than 30-35 centimeters. They invented a "rail bridge" that was superimposed on the destroyed area. The Nazis compensated for the shortage of linen using rarely used Belgian and Dutch branches.

Thus, at the first stage, the “Rail War” caused, according to various estimates, more damage to the Red Army itself than to the Germans.

When carrying out the second and third stages, the leadership of the partisan movement took into account the mistakes. This time they did not carry out single “spot” explosions, but blew up rails over large areas and destroyed sleepers. In December 1943, the third stage was completed.

Despite the mistakes made, the “Rail War” made it possible to reduce the main cargo flow that went from Europe to the East by more than 30%.