3 Crimean War. Progress of military operations. Increasing anti-Russian sentiments in Western European countries

The article briefly describes the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which influenced further development Russia and became the immediate reason for the reforms of Alexander II. The war revealed Russia's significant lag behind Europe both in military field, and in all spheres of government.

1. Causes of the Crimean War
2. Progress of the Crimean War
3. Results of the Crimean War

Causes of the Crimean War

• The cause of the Crimean War was an aggravation in the middle of the 19th century. eastern question. Western powers showed increased interest in the territories of the weakening Ottoman Empire in Europe, and plans were made for the possible division of these territories. Russia was interested in seizing control of the Black Sea straits, which was economically necessary. A stronger Russia would allow it to expand its influence in the region, which worried Western countries. They adhered to the policy of maintaining a weak Turkey as a source of constant danger to the Russian Empire. Turkey was promised Crimea and the Caucasus as a reward for a successful war with Russia.
• The central reason for the war was the struggle between the Russian and French clergy for the possession of holy places in Palestine. Nicholas I, in the form of an ultimatum, declared to the Turkish government that it recognized the right of the Russian emperor to provide assistance to all Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire (mainly the Balkan region). Hoping for support and promises from the Western powers, Türkiye rejected the ultimatum. It became clear that war could no longer be avoided.

Progress of the Crimean War

• In June 1853, Russia sent troops into the territory of Moldavia and Wallachia. The pretext is the protection of the Slavic population. In response to this in the fall, Türkiye declares war on Russia.
• Until the end of the year, Russia's military actions are successful. It expands its sphere of influence on the Danube, wins victories in the Caucasus, and the Russian squadron blocks Turkish ports on the Black Sea.
• Russian victories are causing concern in the West. The situation changes in 1854, when the fleet of England and France enters the Black Sea. Russia declares war on them. After this, European squadrons are sent to blockade Russian ports in the Baltic and Far East. The blockades were of a demonstrative nature; landing attempts ended in failure.
• Russia's successes in Moldavia and Wallachia ended under pressure from Austria, which forced the withdrawal of the Russian army and itself occupied the Danube principalities. A real threat has emerged to create a pan-European coalition against Russia. Nicholas I is forced to concentrate his main forces on the western border.
• Meanwhile, Crimea becomes the main arena of the war. The Allies are blocking the Russian fleet in Sevastopol. Then a landing occurs and the Russian army is defeated on the river. Alma. In the fall of 1854, the heroic defense of Sevastopol began.
• The Russian army is still winning victories in Transcaucasia, but it is already becoming clear that the war is lost.
• By the end of 1855, the besiegers of Sevastopol managed to capture the southern part of the city, which, however, did not lead to the surrender of the fortress. The huge number of casualties forces the allies to abandon further assault attempts. The fighting actually stops.
• In 1856, a peace treaty was signed in Paris, which is a black page in the history of Russian diplomacy. Russia was losing the Black Sea Fleet and all bases on the Black Sea coast. Only Sevastopol remained in Russian hands in exchange for the Turkish fortress of Kars captured in the Caucasus.

Results of the Crimean War

• In addition to territorial concessions and losses, Russia suffered a serious moral blow. Having shown its backwardness during the war, Russia was excluded from the list of great powers for a long time and was no longer perceived in Europe as a serious adversary.
• Nevertheless, the war became a necessary lesson for Russia, revealing all its shortcomings. There was an understanding in society of the need for significant changes. The reforms of Alexander II were a natural consequence of the defeat.

Crimean War (Eastern War), Russia's war with the coalition of Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia for dominance in the Middle East. By the middle of the 19th century. Great Britain and France ousted Russia from the Middle Eastern markets and brought Turkey under their influence. Emperor Nicholas I unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with Great Britain on the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East, and then decided to restore lost positions by direct pressure on Turkey. Great Britain and France contributed to the escalation of the conflict, hoping to weaken Russia and seize Crimea, the Caucasus and other territories from it. The pretext for the war was a dispute between the Orthodox and Catholic clergy in 1852 over the ownership of “holy places” in Palestine. In February 1853, Nicholas I sent Ambassador Extraordinary A.S. Menshikov to Constantinople, who issued an ultimatum demanding that the Orthodox subjects of the Turkish Sultan be placed under the special protection of the Russian Tsar. The tsarist government counted on the support of Prussia and Austria and considered an alliance between Great Britain and France impossible.

However, the English Prime Minister J. Palmerston, fearing the strengthening of Russia, agreed to an agreement with the French Emperor Napoleon III on joint actions against Russia. In May 1853, the Turkish government rejected the Russian ultimatum, and Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey. With the consent of Turkey, the Anglo-French squadron entered the Dardanelles. On June 21 (July 3), Russian troops entered the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the nominal sovereignty of the Turkish Sultan. Supported by Great Britain and France, the Sultan on September 27 (October 9) demanded the cleansing of the principalities, and on October 4 (16), 1853 he declared war on Russia.

Against 82 thousand. Türkiye deployed almost 150 thousand to the army of General M.D. Gorchakov on the Danube. Omer Pasha's army, but attacks by Turkish troops at Cetati, Zhurzhi and Calarash were repulsed. Russian artillery destroyed the Turkish Danube flotilla. In Transcaucasia, the Turkish army of Abdi Pasha (about 100 thousand people) was opposed by the weak garrisons of Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, Alexandropol and Erivan (about 5 thousand), since the main forces of the Russian troops were busy fighting the highlanders (see. Caucasian War 1817-64). From Crimea it was hastily transferred by sea infantry division(16 thousand) and 10 thousand were formed. Armenian-Georgian militia, which made it possible to concentrate 30 thousand troops under the command of General V. O. Bebutov. The main forces of the Turks (about 40 thousand) moved to Alexandropol, and their Ardahan detachment (18 thousand) tried to break through the Borjomi Gorge to Tiflis, but was repulsed, and on November 14 (26) they were defeated near Akhaltsikhe by 7 thousand. detachment of General I.M. Andronnikov. On November 19 (December 1), Bebutov’s troops (10 thousand) defeated the main Turkish forces (36 thousand) at Bashkadyklar.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet blocked Turkish ships in the ports. On November 18 (30), a squadron under the command of Vice Admiral P. S. Nakhimov destroyed the Turkish Black Sea Fleet in the Battle of Sinop 1853. Turkey's defeats accelerated the entry of Great Britain and France into the war. On December 23, 1853 (January 4, 1854), the Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea. On February 9 (21), Russia declared war on Great Britain and France. On March 11 (23), 1854, Russian troops crossed the Danube at Brailov, Galati and Izmail and concentrated in Northern Dobruja. On April 10 (22), the Anglo-French squadron bombarded Odessa. In June - July, Anglo-French troops landed in Varna, and the superior forces of the Anglo-French-Turkish fleet (34 battleships and 55 frigates, including most steam frigates) blocked the Russian fleet (14 battleships sailing ships, 6 frigates and 6 steam-frigates) in Sevastopol. Russia was significantly inferior to Western European countries in the field of military equipment. Its fleet consisted mainly of outdated sailing ships, its army was armed mainly with short-range flintlock shotguns, while the Allies were armed with rifles. The threat of intervention in the war on the side of the anti-Russian coalition of Austria, Prussia and Sweden forced Russia to keep the main army forces on its western borders.

On the Danube, Russian troops besieged the fortress of Silistria on May 5 (17), but due to the hostile position of Austria, on June 9 (21), the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich, gave the order to withdraw beyond the Danube. Early July 3 French divisions moved from Varna to cover the Russian troops, but a cholera epidemic forced them to return. By September 1854, Russian troops retreated beyond the river. Prut and the principalities were occupied by Austrian troops.

In the Baltic Sea, the Anglo-French squadrons of Vice Admiral Charles Napier and Vice Admiral A.F. Parseval-Deschene (11 screw and 15 sailing battleships, 32 steam frigates and 7 sailing frigates) blocked the Russian Baltic Fleet (26 sailing battleships ships, 9 steam frigates and 9 sailing frigates) in Kronstadt and Sveaborg. Not daring to attack these bases due to Russian minefields, which were used for the first time in combat, the Allies began a blockade of the coast and bombarded a number of settlements in Finland. July 26 (August 7) ​​1854 11 thousand. The Anglo-French landing force landed on the Åland Islands and besieged Bomarsund, which surrendered after the destruction of the fortifications. Attempts by other landings (in Ekenes, Ganges, Gamlakarleby and Abo) ended in failure. In the fall of 1854, the allied squadrons left the Baltic Sea. On the White Sea, English ships bombarded Kola and the Solovetsky Monastery in 1854, but the attempt to attack Arkhangelsk failed. The garrison of Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka under the command of Major General V. S. Zavoiko on August 18-24 (August 30 - September 5), 1854, repelled the attack of the Anglo-French squadron, defeating the landing party (see Peter and Paul Defense of 1854).

In Transcaucasia, the Turkish army under the command of Mustafa Zarif Pasha was strengthened to 120 thousand people and in May 1854 went on the offensive against 40 thousand. Bebutov's Russian corps. June 4 (16) 34 thousand. The Batumi Turkish detachment was defeated in a battle on the river. Choroh 13-thousand Andronnikov’s detachment, and on July 17 (29), Russian troops (3.5 thousand) defeated 20 thousand in an oncoming battle at the Chingil Pass. The Bayazet detachment occupied Bayazet on July 19 (31). Bebutov's main forces (18 thousand) were delayed by the invasion of Eastern Georgia by Shamil's troops and went on the offensive only in July. At the same time, the main Turkish forces (60 thousand) moved to Alexandropol. On July 24 (August 5) at Kuryuk-Dara, the Turkish army was defeated and ceased to exist as an active fighting force.

On September 2 (14), 1854, the allied fleet began landing near Evpatoria with 62 thousand. Anglo-Franco-Turkish army. Russian troops in Crimea under the command of Menshikov (33.6 thousand) were defeated on the river. Alma and retreated to Sevastopol, and then to Bakhchisarai, leaving Sevastopol to the mercy of fate. At the same time, Marshal A. Saint-Arnaud and General F. J. Raglan, who commanded the allied army, did not dare to attack the northern side of Sevastopol, undertook a roundabout maneuver and, having missed Menshikov’s troops on the march, approached Sevastopol from the south with 18 thousand sailors and soldiers at the head with Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov and P.S. Nakhimov, they took up defensive positions, launching the construction of fortifications with the help of the population. To protect the approaches from the sea at the entrance to Sevastopol Bay, several old ships were sunk, the crews and guns from which were sent to fortifications. The 349-day heroic defense of Sevastopol 1854-55 began.

The first bombardment of Sevastopol on October 5 (17) did not reach its target, which forced Raglan and General F. Canrobert (who replaced the deceased Saint-Arnaud) to postpone the assault. Menshikov, having received reinforcements, tried to attack the enemy from the rear in October, but in the Battle of Balaklava 1854 success was not developed, and in the Battle of Inkerman 1854 Russian troops were defeated.

In 1854, diplomatic negotiations between the warring parties were held in Vienna through the mediation of Austria. Great Britain and France, as peace conditions, demanded a ban on Russia keeping a navy in the Black Sea, Russia's renunciation of the protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia and claims to patronage of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects, as well as "freedom of navigation" on the Danube (i.e., deprivation of Russia access to its mouths). On December 2 (14), Austria announced an alliance with Great Britain and France. On December 28 (January 9, 1855) a conference of the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Austria and Russia opened, but the negotiations did not produce results and were interrupted in April 1855.

On January 14 (26), 1855, Sardinia entered the war, sending 15 thousand people to the Crimea. frame. 35 thousand concentrated in Yevpatoria. Turkish corps of Omer Pasha. 5(17) February 19 th. the detachment of General S.A. Khrulev tried to take control of Yevpatoria, but the assault was repulsed. Menshikov was replaced by General M.D. Gorchakov.

On March 28 (April 9), the 2nd bombardment of Sevastopol began, revealing the overwhelming superiority of the Allies in the amount of ammunition. But the heroic resistance of the defenders of Sevastopol forced the allies to postpone the assault again. Canrobert was replaced by General J. Pelissier, a supporter of active action. 12(24) May 16 thousand. The French corps landed in Kerch. Allied ships devastated the Azov coast, but their landings near Arabat, Genichesk and Taganrog were repulsed. In May, the Allies carried out the 3rd bombardment of Sevastopol and drove Russian troops out of the advanced fortifications. On June 6 (18), after the 4th bombardment, an assault was launched on the bastions of the Ship Side, but it was repulsed. On August 4 (16), Russian troops attacked the Allied positions on the river. Black, but were thrown back. Pelissier and General Simpson (who replaced the deceased Raglan) carried out the 5th bombardment, and on August 27 (September 8), after the 6th bombardment, they began a general assault on Sevastopol. After the fall of Malakhov Kurgan, Russian troops left the city on the evening of August 27 and crossed to the North Side. The remaining ships were sunk.

In the Baltic in 1855, the Anglo-French fleet under the command of Admiral R. Dundas and C. Penaud limited itself to blockading the coast and bombarding Sveaborg and other cities. On the Black Sea, the Allies landed troops in Novorossiysk and occupied Kinburn. On the Pacific coast, the Allied landing at De-Kastri Bay was repelled.

In Transcaucasia, the corps of General N. N. Muravyov (about 40 thousand) in the spring of 1855 pushed back the Bayazet and Ardagan Turkish detachments to Erzurum and blocked 33 thousand. garrison of Kars. To save Kars, the Allies landed 45 thousand troops in Sukhum. Omer Pasha's corps, but he met October 23-25 ​​(November 4-6) on the river. Inguri stubborn resistance of the Russian detachment of General I.K. Bagration-Mukhransky, who then stopped the enemy on the river. Tskhenistskali. A partisan movement of the Georgian and Abkhaz population unfolded in the Turkish rear. On November 16 (28), the Kars garrison capitulated. Omer Pasha went to Sukhum, from where he was evacuated to Turkey in February 1856.

At the end of 1855, hostilities virtually ceased, and negotiations resumed in Vienna. Russia did not have trained reserves, there were not enough weapons, ammunition, food, financial resources, the anti-serfdom peasant movement grew, intensified in connection with the massive recruitment into the militia, and the liberal-noble opposition intensified. The position of Sweden, Prussia and especially Austria, which threatened war, became increasingly hostile. In this situation, tsarism was forced to make concessions. On March 18 (30), the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 was signed, according to which Russia agreed to neutralize the Black Sea with a ban on having a navy and bases there, ceded the southern part of Bessarabia to Turkey, pledged not to build fortifications on the Åland Islands and recognized the protectorate of the great powers over Moldova, Wallachia and Serbia. The Crimean War was unjust and aggressive on both sides.

The Crimean War came important stage in the development of military art. After it, all armies were re-equipped with rifled weapons and the sailing fleet was replaced by steam. During the war, the inconsistency of column tactics was revealed, and rifle chain tactics and elements of positional warfare were developed. The experience of the Crimean War was used in carrying out military reforms in the 1860-70s. in Russia and was widely used in wars of the 2nd half of the 19th century.

(material prepared on the basis of fundamental works
Russian historians N.M. Karamzin, N.I. Kostomarov,
V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.M. Solovyov, and others...)

In short, the Crimean War broke out due to Russia's desire to seize the Bosporus and Dardanelles from Turkey. However, France and England joined the conflict. Since the Russian Empire lagged far behind in economically, then it was only a matter of time before she lost. The consequences were heavy sanctions, the penetration of foreign capital, the decline of Russian authority, as well as an attempt to resolve the peasant question.

Causes of the Crimean War

The opinion that the war began because of a religious conflict and “protection of the Orthodox” is fundamentally incorrect. Since wars never started for a reason different religions or infringement of some interests of fellow believers. These arguments are only a reason for conflict. The reason is always the economic interests of the parties.

Türkiye by that time was the “sick link of Europe.” It became clear that it would not last long and would soon fall apart, so the question of who would inherit its territories became increasingly relevant. Russia wanted to annex Moldavia and Wallachia with its Orthodox population, and also in the future to capture the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.

The beginning and end of the Crimean War

The following stages can be distinguished in the Crimean War of 1853-1855:

1. Danube campaign. On June 14, 1853, the emperor issued a decree on the start of a military operation. On June 21, the troops crossed the border with Turkey and on July 3 entered Bucharest without firing a single shot. At the same time, minor military skirmishes began at sea and on land.

1. Battle of Sinop. On November 18, 1953, a huge Turkish squadron was completely destroyed. This was Russia's largest victory in the Crimean War.

1. Entry of the Allies into the war. In March 1854, France and England declared war on Russia. Realizing that he could not cope with the leading powers alone, the emperor withdrew his troops from Moldavia and Wallachia.

1. Sea blockade. In June-July 1854, a Russian squadron of 14 battleships and 12 frigates was completely blocked in the Sevastopol Bay by the Allied fleet, numbering 34 battleships and 55 frigates.

1. Allied landing in Crimea. On September 2, 1854, the allies began to land in Yevpatoria, and already on the 8th of the same month they inflicted a fairly large defeat Russian army(a division of 33,000 people), which tried to stop the movement of troops towards Sevastopol. The losses were small, but they had to retreat.

1. Destruction of part of the fleet. September 9 5 battleships and 2 frigates (30% total number) were sunk at the entrance to Sevastopol Bay to prevent the Allied squadron from breaking into it.

1. Attempts to release the blockade. On October 13 and November 5, 1854, Russian troops made 2 attempts to lift the blockade of Sevastopol. Both were unsuccessful, but without major losses.

1. Battle for Sevastopol. From March to September 1855 there were 5 bombings of the city. There was another attempt by Russian troops to break the blockade, but it failed. On September 8, Malakhov Kurgan, a strategic height, was taken. Because of this, Russian troops abandoned the southern part of the city, blew up rocks with ammunition and weapons, and sank the entire fleet.

1. The surrender of half the city and the sinking of the Black Sea squadron produced a strong shock in all circles of society. For this reason, Emperor Nicholas I agreed to a truce.

War participants

One of the reasons for Russia's defeat is the numerical superiority of the allies. But actually it is not. The ratio of the ground part of the army is shown in the table.

As you can see, although the allies had an overall numerical superiority, this did not affect every battle. Moreover, even when the ratio was approximately parity or in our favor, Russian troops still could not achieve success. However, the main question remains not why Russia did not win without having numerical superiority, but why the state was not able to supply more soldiers.

Important! In addition, the British and French contracted dysentery during the march, which greatly affected the combat effectiveness of the units .

The balance of fleet forces in the Black Sea is shown in the table:

The main naval force was battleships- heavy ships with a huge number of guns. Frigates were used as fast and well-armed hunters that hunted transport ships. Russia's large number of small boats and gunboats did not provide superiority at sea, since their combat potential was extremely small.

Heroes of the Crimean War

Another reason is called command errors. However, most of these opinions are expressed after the fact, that is, when the critic already knows what decision should have been taken.

1. Nakhimov, Pavel Stepanovich. He showed himself most at sea during the Battle of Sinop, when he sank a Turkish squadron. He did not participate in land battles, since he did not have the relevant experience (he was still a naval admiral). During the defense, he served as governor, that is, he was involved in equipping the troops.

1. Kornilov, Vladimir Alekseevich. He proved himself to be a brave and active commander. In fact, he invented active defense tactics with tactical sorties, laying minefields, and mutual assistance between land and naval artillery.

1. Menshikov, Alexander Sergeevich. It is he who receives all the blame for the lost war. However, firstly, Menshikov personally led only 2 operations. In one he retreated for completely objective reasons (numerical superiority of the enemy). In another he lost because of his miscalculation, but at that moment his front was no longer decisive, but auxiliary. Secondly, Menshikov also gave quite rational orders (sinking ships in the bay), which helped the city survive longer.

Causes of defeat

Many sources indicate that Russian troops lost because of the fittings, which the Allied armies had in large quantities. This is an erroneous point of view, which is duplicated even on Wikipedia, so it needs to be analyzed in detail:

1. The Russian army also had fittings, and there were enough of them too.
2. The rifle was fired at 1200 meters - it’s just a myth. Really long-range rifles were adopted much later. On average, the rifles were fired at 400-450 meters.
3. The rifles were shot very accurately - also a myth. Yes, their accuracy was more accurate, but only by 30-50% and only at 100 meters. As the distance increased, the superiority dropped to 20-30% or lower. In addition, the rate of fire was 3-4 times lower.
4. During major battles, the first half of the 19th century centuries, the smoke from gunpowder was so thick that visibility was reduced to 20-30 meters.
5. The accuracy of a weapon does not mean the accuracy of a fighter. It is extremely difficult to teach a person to hit a target from 100 meters even with a modern rifle. And from a rifle that did not have today’s aiming devices, it was even more difficult to shoot at a target.
6. During combat stress, only 5% of soldiers think about targeted shooting.
7. The main losses were always caused by artillery. Namely, 80-90% of all killed and wounded soldiers were from cannon fire with grapeshot.

Despite the numerical disadvantage of guns, we had an overwhelming superiority in artillery, which was determined by the following factors:

• our guns were more powerful and more accurate;
• Russia had the best artillerymen in the world;
• the batteries stood in prepared high positions, which gave them an advantage in firing range;
• The Russians were fighting on their territory, which is why all positions were targeted, meaning we could immediately start hitting without missing a beat.

So what were the reasons for the loss? First, we have completely lost the diplomatic game. France, which supplied the bulk of its troops to the theater of operations, could be persuaded to stand up for us. Napoleon III did not have any real economic goals, which means there was an opportunity to lure him to his side. Nicholas I hoped that the allies would keep their word. He did not ask for any official papers, which was big mistake. This can be deciphered as “dizziness with success.”

Secondly, the feudal system of troop control was significantly inferior to the capitalist military machine. First of all, this manifests itself in discipline. A living example: when Menshikov gave the order to scuttle the ship in the bay, Kornilov... refused to carry it out. This situation is the norm for the feudal paradigm of military thinking, where there is not a commander and a subordinate, but a suzerain and a vassal.

However main reason The loss is Russia's huge economic lag. For example, the table below shows the main economic indicators:

This was precisely the reason for the lack of modern ships, weapons, as well as the inability to supply ammunition, ammunition and medicines on time. By the way, cargo from France and England reached Crimea faster than from the central regions of Russia to Crimea. And further shining example– the Russian Empire, seeing the deplorable situation in Crimea, was unable to deliver new troops to the theater of operations, while the allies brought reserves across several seas.

Consequences of the Crimean War

Despite the local nature of the hostilities, Russia suffered greatly in this war. First of all, a huge public debt appeared - over a billion rubles. The money supply (assignations) increased from 311 to 735 million. The ruble has fallen in price several times. By the end of the war, market sellers simply refused to exchange silver coins for paper money.

Such instability led to a rapid rise in the price of bread, meat and other food products, which led to peasant revolts. The schedule of peasant performances is as follows:

• 1855 – 63;
• 1856 – 71;
• 1857 – 121;
• 1858 – 423 (this is already the scale of Pugachevism);
• 1859 – 182;
• 1860 – 212;
• 1861 - 1340 (and this is already a civil war).

Russia lost the right to have warships in the Black Sea, gave up some lands, but all this was quickly returned during subsequent Russian-Turkish wars. Therefore, the main consequence of the war for the empire can be considered the abolition of serfdom. However, this “abolition” was only a transfer of peasants from feudal slavery to mortgage slavery, as clearly evidenced by the number of uprisings in 1861 (indicated above).

Results for Russia

What conclusions can be drawn? In war after the 19th century, the main and only means of victory is not modern missiles, tanks and ships, but the economy. In case of mass military clashes, it is extremely important that the weapons are not only high-tech, but that the state economy can constantly update all weapons in the conditions of the rapid destruction of human resources and military equipment.

CRIMEAN WAR

1853-1856

Plan

1. Prerequisites for the war

2. Progress of military operations

3. Actions in Crimea and defense of Sevastopol

4.Military actions on other fronts

5.Diplomatic efforts

6. Results of the war

Crimean (Eastern) War 1853-56 was conducted between Russian Empire and the coalition of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), France, Great Britain and Sardinia for dominance in the Middle East, the Black Sea basin, and the Caucasus. The Allied powers no longer wanted to see Russia on the world political stage. A new war provided an excellent opportunity to achieve this goal. Initially, England and France planned to wear out Russia in the fight against Turkey, and then, under the pretext of protecting the latter, they hoped to attack Russia. In accordance with this plan, it was planned to launch military operations on several fronts, separated from one another (on the Black and Baltic seas, in the Caucasus, where they placed special hope on the mountain population and on the spiritual leader of the Muslims of Chechnya and Dagestan-Shamil).

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

The reason for the conflict was a dispute between the Catholic and Orthodox clergy over the ownership of Christian shrines in Palestine (in particular, regarding the issue of control over the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem). The prelude was the conflict between Nicholas I and the French Emperor Napoleon III. The Russian emperor considered his French “colleague” illegal, because The Bonaparte dynasty was excluded from the French throne by the Congress of Vienna (a pan-European conference that determined the borders of European states after the Napoleonic wars). Napoleon III, aware of the fragility of his power, wanted to divert the attention of the people with a war against Russia that was popular at that time (revenge for the War of 1812) and at the same time satisfy his irritation against Nicholas I. He came to power with the support of catholic church, Napoleon also sought to repay his ally by defending the interests of the Vatican in the international arena, which led to a conflict with the Orthodox Church and directly with Russia. (The French referred to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire on the right of control over Christian holy places in Palestine (in the 19th century, the territory of the Ottoman Empire), and Russia referred to the decree of the Sultan, which restored the rights Orthodox Church in Palestine and gave Russia the right to defend the interests of Christians in the Ottoman Empire). France demanded that the keys to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem be given to the Catholic clergy, and Russia demanded that they remain with the Orthodox community. Turkey, which was in a state of decline in the mid-19th century, did not have the opportunity to refuse either side, and promised to fulfill the demands of both Russia and France. When the typical Turkish diplomatic ploy was exposed, France brought a 90-gun steam battleship under the walls of Istanbul. As a result of this, the keys to the Church of the Nativity were transferred to France (i.e. the Catholic Church). In response, Russia began mobilizing the army on the border with Moldavia and Wallachia.

In February 1853, Nicholas I sent Prince A.S. Menshikov as ambassador to the Turkish Sultan. with an ultimatum to recognize the rights of the Orthodox Church to holy places in Palestine and to provide Russia with protection over Christians in the Ottoman Empire (who made up approximately a third of the total population). The Russian government counted on the support of Austria and Prussia and considered an alliance between Great Britain and France impossible. However, Great Britain, fearing the strengthening of Russia, agreed to an agreement with France. The British Ambassador, Lord Stradford-Radcliffe, convinced the Turkish Sultan to partially satisfy Russia's demands, promising support in the event of war. As a result, the Sultan issued a decree on the inviolability of the rights of the Orthodox Church to holy places, but refused to enter into an agreement on protection. Prince Menshikov behaved defiantly at meetings with the Sultan, demanding full satisfaction of the ultimatum. Feeling the support of its Western allies, Türkiye was in no hurry to respond to Russia’s demands. Without waiting for a positive response, Menshikov and the embassy staff left Constantinople. Trying to put pressure on the Turkish government, Nicholas I ordered troops to occupy the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia subordinate to the Sultan. (Initially, the plans of the Russian command were bold and decisive. It was planned to carry out the “Bosphorus Expedition”, which included equipping landing ships to reach the Bosphorus and connect with the rest of the troops. When the Turkish fleet went to sea, it was planned to defeat it and then proceed to the Bosphorus. Breakthrough Russian stage in the Bosphorus threatened the capital of Turkey, Constantinople. In order to prevent France from supporting the Ottoman Sultan, the plan provided for the occupation of the Dardanelles. Nicholas I accepted the plan, but after listening to the next anti-arguments of Prince Menshikov, he rejected it. Subsequently, other active offensive plans were rejected. The emperor's choice settled on another faceless plan, refusing any active action. The troops, under the command of Adjutant General Gorchakov, were ordered to reach the Danube, but the Black Sea Fleet was to avoid military action to remain on its shores and avoid battle, allocating only cruisers. surveillance of enemy fleets. With such a demonstration of force, the Russian emperor hoped to put pressure on Turkey and accept its terms.)

This caused a protest from the Porte, which led to the convening of a conference of commissioners from England, France, Prussia and Austria. Its result was the Vienna Note, a compromise on all sides, which demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube principalities, but gave Russia the nominal right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire and nominal control over the holy places in Palestine.

The Vienna Note was accepted by Nicholas I, but rejected Turkish Sultan, who succumbed to the promised military support of the British ambassador. Porta proposed various changes to the note, which caused a refusal from the Russian side. As a result, France and Britain entered into an alliance with each other with obligations to defend Turkish territory.

Trying to use the favorable opportunity to “teach a lesson” to Russia with someone else’s hands, the Ottoman Sultan demanded to clear the territory of the Danube principalities within two weeks, and after these conditions were not met, on October 4 (16), 1853, he declared war on Russia. On October 20 (November 1), 1853, Russia responded with a similar statement.

PROGRESS OF MILITARY ACTIONS

The Crimean War can be divided into two stages. The first was the Russian-Turkish company itself (November 1853 - April 1854) and the second (April 1854 - February 1856), when the Allies entered the war.

STATE ARMED FORCES RUSSIA

As subsequent events showed, Russia was not organizationally and technically ready for war. The combat strength of the army was far from what was listed; the reserve system was unsatisfactory; due to the intervention of Austria, Prussia and Sweden, Russia was forced to keep a significant part of the army on the western border. The technical lag of the Russian army and navy has acquired alarming proportions.

ARMY

In the 1840-50s, the process of replacing outdated smooth-bore guns with rifled ones was actively underway in European armies. At the beginning of the war, the share of rifled guns in the Russian army was approximately 4-5% of the total; in French - 1/3; in English - more than half.

FLEET

WITH early XIX century, European fleets replaced outdated sailing ships with modern steam ones. On the eve of the Crimean War, the Russian fleet ranked third in the world in terms of the number of warships (after England and France), but was significantly inferior to the Allied fleets in terms of the number of steam ships.

BEGINNING OF MILITARY ACTIONS

In November 1853 on the Danube against 82 thousand. army of General Gorchakov M.D. Türkiye nominated almost 150 thousand. Omar Pasha's army. But the Turkish attacks were repulsed, and Russian artillery destroyed the Danube flotilla of Turkey. The main forces of Omar Pasha (about 40 thousand people) moved to Alexandropol, and their Ardahan detachment (18 thousand people) tried to break through the Borjomi Gorge to Tiflis, but was stopped, and on November 14 (26) defeated near Akhaltsikhe 7 -thousand detachment of General Andronnikov I.M. November 19 (December 1) the troops of Prince Bebutov V.O. (10 thousand people) near Bashkadyklar defeated the main 36 thousand. Turkish army.

At sea, Russia also initially enjoyed success. In mid-November, the Turkish squadron proceeded to the Sukhumi (Sukhum-Kale) and Poti area for landing, but due to strong storm was forced to take refuge in Sinop Bay. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral P.S. Nakhimov, became aware of this, and he led his ships to Sinop. On November 18 (30), the Battle of Sinop took place, during which the Russian squadron defeated the Turkish fleet. The Battle of Sinop went down in history as the last major battle of the era of the sailing fleet.

The defeat of Turkey accelerated the entry of France and England into the war. After Nakhimov's victory at Sinop, the British and French squadrons entered the Black Sea under the pretext of protecting Turkish ships and ports from attacks from the Russian side. On January 17 (29), 1854, the French emperor presented an ultimatum to Russia: withdraw troops from the Danube principalities and begin negotiations with Turkey. On February 9 (21), Russia rejected the ultimatum and announced a break diplomatic relations with France and England.

On March 15 (27), 1854, Great Britain and France declared war on Russia. On March 30 (April 11), Russia responded with a similar statement.

To forestall the enemy in the Balkans, Nicholas I ordered an offensive in this area. In March 1854, the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal I.F. Paskevich. invaded Bulgaria. At first, the company developed successfully - the Russian army crossed the Danube at Galati, Izmail and Brailaa and occupied the fortresses of Machin, Tulcea and Isaccea. But later the Russian command showed indecisiveness, and the siege of Silistria began only on May 5 (18). However, the fear of entering the war was on the side of the Austrian coalition, which, in alliance with Prussia, concentrated 50 thousand. army in Galicia and Transylvania, and then, with the permission of Turkey, entered the latter’s possessions on the banks of the Danube, forcing the Russian command to lift the siege, and then at the end of August completely withdraw troops from this area.

“The Crimean War showed the rottenness and powerlessness of serf Russia,” these were the words that a friend of the Russian people, Vladimir Ulyanov, better known as Lenin, found for our country. With this vulgar stigma, the war entered Soviet historiography. Lenin and the state he created have long since passed away, but in the public consciousness the events of 1853-56 are still assessed exactly as the leader of the world proletariat said.

In general, the perception of the Crimean War can be likened to an iceberg. Everyone remembers the “top” from their school days: the defense of Sevastopol, the death of Nakhimov, the sinking of the Russian fleet. As a rule, those events are judged at the level of clichés implanted in people’s heads by many years of anti-Russian propaganda. Here is the “technical backwardness” Tsarist Russia, and “shameful defeat of tsarism”, and “humiliating peace treaty”. But the true scale and significance of the war remains little known. It seems to many that this was some kind of peripheral, almost colonial confrontation, far from the main centers of Russia.

The simplified scheme looks simple: the enemy landed troops in Crimea, defeated the Russian army there, and, having achieved his goals, solemnly evacuated. But is it? Let's figure it out.

Firstly, who and how proved that Russia’s defeat was shameful? The mere fact of losing does not mean anything about shame. In the end, Germany lost its capital in World War II, was completely occupied and signed an unconditional surrender. But have you ever heard anyone call it a shameful defeat?

Let's look at the events of the Crimean War from this point of view. Three empires (British, French and Ottoman) and one kingdom (Piedmont-Sardinia) then opposed Russia. What was Britain like then? This is a gigantic country, an industrial leader, and the best navy in the world. What is France? It is the third economy in the world, the second fleet, numerous and well trained ground army. It is easy to see that the alliance of these two states has already had such a resonant effect that the combined forces of the coalition had absolutely incredible power. But there was also the Ottoman Empire.

Yes, by the middle of the 19th century, her golden period was a thing of the past, and she even began to be called the sick man of Europe. But we should not forget that this was said in comparison with the most developed countries of the world. The Turkish fleet had steamships, the army was numerous and partially armed with rifled weapons, officers were sent to study in Western countries, and in addition, foreign instructors worked on the territory of the Ottoman Empire itself.

By the way, during the First World War, having already lost almost all of its European possessions, “sick Europe” defeated Britain and France in the Gallipoli campaign. And if this was the Ottoman Empire at the end of its existence, then one must assume that in the Crimean War it was an even more dangerous opponent.

The role of the Sardinian kingdom is usually not taken into account at all, but this small country put up a twenty thousand strong, well-armed army against us. Thus, Russia was opposed by a powerful coalition. Let's remember this moment.

Now let's see what goals the enemy was pursuing. According to his plans, the Aland Islands, Finland, the Baltic region, Crimea and the Caucasus were to be torn away from Russia. In addition, the Kingdom of Poland was restored, and an independent state of “Circassia”, a vassal state of Turkey, was created in the Caucasus. That's not all. The Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia) were under the protectorate of Russia, but now it was planned to transfer them to Austria. In other words, Austrian troops would reach the southwestern borders of our country.

They wanted to divide the trophies as follows: the Baltic states - Prussia, the Aland Islands and Finland - Sweden, Crimea and the Caucasus - Turkey. Circassia is given to the leader of the highlanders Shamil, and, by the way, during the Crimean War his troops also fought against Russia.

It is generally believed that Palmerston, an influential member of the British cabinet, lobbied for this plan, while the French Emperor had a different view. However, we will give the floor to Napoleon III himself. This is what he told one of the Russian diplomats:

“I intend... to make every effort to prevent the spread of your influence and force you to return to Asia from whence you came. Russia - not European country, it should not be and will not be so if France does not forget about the role that it should play in European history... Once you weaken your ties with Europe, and you yourself will begin to move to the East in order to again turn into Asian country. It won’t be difficult to deprive you of Finland, the Baltic lands, Poland and Crimea.”

This is the fate England and France prepared for Russia. Aren't the motifs familiar? Our generation was “lucky” to live to see the implementation of this plan, but now imagine that the ideas of Palmerston and Napoleon III would have been realized not in 1991, but in the middle of the 19th century. Imagine that Russia enters the First World War in a situation where the Baltic states are already in the hands of Germany, when Austria-Hungary has a bridgehead in Moldova and Wallachia, and Turkish garrisons are stationed in Crimea. And the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, in this geopolitical situation, completely turns into a deliberate disaster.

But “backward, powerless and rotten” Russia left no stone unturned in these projects. None of this came to fruition. The Paris Congress of 1856 drew a line under the Crimean War. According to the concluded agreement, Russia lost a tiny part of Bessarabia, agreed to free navigation on the Danube and neutralization of the Black Sea. Yes, neutralization meant a ban on Russia and the Ottoman Empire to have naval arsenals on the Black Sea coast and to maintain a military Black Sea fleet. But compare the terms of the agreement with what goals the anti-Russian coalition initially pursued. Do you think this is a shame? Is this a humiliating defeat?

Now let's move on to the second important issue, to the “technical backwardness of serf Russia.” When it comes to this, people always remember rifled weapons and the steam fleet. They say that the British and French armies were armed with rifled guns, while the Russian soldiers were armed with outdated smoothbore guns. While advanced England, together with advanced France, had long ago switched to steamships, Russian ships were sailing. It would seem that everything is obvious and the backwardness is obvious. You will laugh, but the Russian navy had steam ships, and the army had rifled guns. Yes, the fleets of Britain and France were significantly ahead of the Russian one in the number of ships. But excuse me, these are two leading maritime powers. These are countries that have surpassed the whole world at sea for hundreds of years, and have always Russian fleet was weaker.

It must be admitted that the enemy had much more rifled guns. This is true, but it is also true that the Russian army had missile weapons. Moreover, the combat missiles of the Konstantinov system were significantly superior to their Western counterparts. In addition, the Baltic Sea was reliably covered by the domestic mines of Boris Jacobi. This weapon was also one of the best in the world.

However, let's analyze the degree of military "backwardness" of Russia as a whole. To do this, there is no point in going through all types of weapons, comparing each technical characteristic of certain models. It is enough just to look at the ratio of losses in manpower. If Russia really was seriously lagging behind the enemy in terms of armaments, then it is obvious that our losses in the war should have been fundamentally higher.

Total loss figures vary greatly across different sources, but the number of those killed is approximately the same, so let’s turn to this parameter. So, during the entire war, 10,240 people were killed in the army of France, 2,755 in England, 10,000 in Turkey, 24,577 in Russia. About 5 thousand people are added to Russia’s losses. This figure shows the number of deaths among the missing. Thus, total number those killed are considered equal
30,000. As you can see, there is no catastrophic ratio of losses, especially considering that Russia fought for six months longer than England and France.

Of course, in response, we can say that the main losses in the war occurred in the defense of Sevastopol, here the enemy stormed the fortifications, and this led to relatively increased losses. That is, Russia’s “technical backwardness” was partially compensated advantageous position defense

Well, then let’s consider the first battle outside Sevastopol - the Battle of Alma. A coalition army of about 62 thousand people (the absolute majority are French and British) landed in Crimea and moved towards the city. In order to delay the enemy and gain time to prepare the defensive structures of Sevastopol, Russian commander Alexander Menshikov decided to fight near the Alma River. At that time, he managed to gather only 37 thousand people. It also had fewer guns than the coalition, which is not surprising, because three countries opposed Russia at once. In addition, the enemy was also supported from the sea by naval fire.

“According to some indications, the Allies lost 4,300 people on the day of Alma, according to others - 4,500 people. According to later estimates, our troops lost 145 officers and 5,600 lower ranks in the Battle of Alma,” Academician Tarle cites such data in his fundamental work"Crimean War". It is constantly emphasized that during the battle our lack of rifled weapons affected us, but please note that the losses of the parties are quite comparable. Yes, our losses were greater, but the coalition had a significant superiority in manpower, so what does this have to do with the technical backwardness of the Russian army?

An interesting thing: the size of our army turned out to be almost half as large, and there are fewer guns, and the enemy fleet is firing at our positions from the sea, in addition, Russia’s weapons are backward. It would seem that under such circumstances the defeat of the Russians should have been inevitable. What is the real result of the battle? After the battle, the Russian army retreated, maintaining order; the exhausted enemy did not dare to organize pursuit, that is, its movement towards Sevastopol slowed down, which gave the city’s garrison time to prepare for defense. The words of the commander of the British First Division, the Duke of Cambridge, best characterize the state of the “winners”: “Another such victory, and England will not have an army.” This is such a “defeat”, this is the “backwardness of serf Russia.”

I think one non-trivial fact has not escaped the attentive reader, namely the number of Russians in the battle on Alma. Why does the enemy have a significant superiority in manpower? Why does Menshikov have only 37 thousand people? Where was the rest of the Russian army at this time? The answer to the last question is very simple:

“At the end of 1854, the entire border strip of Russia was divided into sections, each subordinate to a special commander with the rights of commander-in-chief of an army or a separate corps. These areas were as follows:

a) The coastal region of the Baltic Sea (Finland, St. Petersburg and Baltic provinces), the military forces of which consisted of 179 battalions, 144 squadrons and hundreds, with 384 guns;

b) Kingdom of Poland and Western provinces - 146 battalions, 100 squadrons and hundreds, with 308 guns;

c) The space along the Danube and the Black Sea to the Bug River - 182 battalions, 285 squadrons and hundreds, with 612 guns;

d) Crimea and the Black Sea coast from the Bug to Perekop - 27 battalions, 19 squadrons and hundreds, 48 ​​guns;

d) shores Sea of ​​Azov and Black Sea region - 31½ battalions, 140 hundreds and squadrons, 54 guns;

f) Caucasian and Transcaucasian regions - 152 battalions, 281 hundreds and a squadron, 289 guns (⅓ of these troops were on the Turkish border, the rest were inside the region, against the mountaineers hostile to us).”

It is easy to notice that the most powerful group of our troops was in the southwestern direction, and not at all in Crimea. In second place the army is coming, covering the Baltic, the third in strength is in the Caucasus, and the fourth is on the western borders.

What explains this, at first glance, strange arrangement of Russians? To answer this question, let’s temporarily leave the battlefields and move to the diplomatic offices, where no less important battles unfolded, and where, in the end, the fate of the entire Crimean War was decided.

British diplomacy set out to win over Prussia, Sweden and the Austrian Empire to its side. In this case, Russia would have to fight almost the entire world. The British acted successfully, Prussia and Austria began to lean toward an anti-Russian position. Tsar Nicholas I is a man of unbending will; he was not going to give up under any circumstances, and began to prepare for the most catastrophic scenario. That is why the main forces of the Russian army had to be kept far from Crimea along the border “arc”: north, west, southwest.

Time passed, the war dragged on. The siege of Sevastopol lasted for almost a year. In the end, at a price heavy losses the enemy occupied part of the city. Yes, yes, no “fall of Sevastopol” never happened, Russian troops simply moved from the south to northern part cities and prepared for further defense. Despite all efforts, the coalition achieved virtually nothing. During the entire period of hostilities, the enemy captured a small part of Crimea and the tiny fortress of Kinburn, but was defeated in the Caucasus. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1856, Russia concentrated over 600 thousand people on its western and southern borders. This is not counting the Caucasian and Black Sea lines. In addition, it was possible to create numerous reserves and gather militias.

What were the representatives of the so-called progressive public doing at this time? As usual, they launched anti-Russian propaganda and distributed leaflets - proclamations.

“Written in a lively language, with full effort to make them understandable to the common people and mainly soldiers, these proclamations were divided into two parts: some were signed by Herzen, Golovin, Sazonov and other persons who left their fatherland; others by the Poles Zenkovich, Zabitsky and Worzel.”

Nevertheless, iron discipline reigned in the army, and few people succumbed to the propaganda of the enemies of our state. Russia was rising to the Second Patriotic War with all the ensuing consequences for the enemy. And then alarming news came from the front of the diplomatic war: Austria openly joined Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and the Sardinian Kingdom. A few days later, Prussia also made threats against St. Petersburg. By that time, Nicholas I had died, and his son Alexander II was on the throne. After weighing all the pros and cons, the king decided to begin negotiations with the coalition.

As mentioned above, the treaty that ended the war was not at all humiliating. The whole world knows about this. In Western historiography, the outcome of the Crimean War for our country is assessed much more objectively than in Russia itself:

“The results of the campaign had little impact on the alignment of international forces. It was decided to make the Danube an international waterway, and declare the Black Sea neutral. But Sevastopol had to be returned to the Russians. Russia, which previously occupied a dominant position in Central Europe, lost its former influence over the next few years. But not for long. The Turkish Empire was saved, and also only for a while. The alliance between England and France did not achieve its goals. The problem of the Holy Lands, which he was supposed to solve, was not even mentioned in the peace treaty. And the Russian Tsar annulled the treaty itself fourteen years later,” this is how Christopher Hibbert described the results of the Crimean War. This is a British historian. For Russia, he found much more correct words than Lenin.

1 Lenin V.I. Complete Works, 5th edition, volume 20, p. 173.
2 History of diplomacy, M., OGIZ State Socio-Economic Publishing House, 1945, p. 447
3 Ibid., p. 455.
4 Trubetskoy A., “Crimean War”, M., Lomonosov, 2010, p.163.
5 Urlanis B.Ts. “Wars and the population of Europe”, Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature, M, 1960, p. 99-100
6 Dubrovin N.F., “History of the Crimean War and the Defense of Sevastopol”, St. Petersburg. Printing house of the Public Benefit Partnership, 1900, p.255
7 Eastern War 1853-1856 Encyclopedic Dictionary F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron
8 Eastern War 1853-1856 Encyclopedic Dictionary of F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron
9 Dubrovin N.F., “History of the Crimean War and the Defense of Sevastopol”, St. Petersburg. Printing house of the Public Benefit Partnership, 1900, p. 203.
10 Hibbert K., “Crimean Campaign 1854-1855. The Tragedy of Lord Raglan", M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2004.